# Federal Reset In The Pipeline? (Episode 40)
Published: 2026-01-12T04:05:20+00:00

## Summary
Political scientist Professor James Chin joins Sam Saad and Syed Akbar Ali to analyze proposed federal institutional reforms, including prime ministerial term limits and freedom of information legislation. The discussion exposes the clash between East Malaysia's unresolved MA63 grievances—such as constitutional revenue shares and parliamentary seat quotas—and Putrajaya's entrenched central authority. While Chin insists historical grievances require structural redistribution, Syed Akbar Ali argues that meaningful accountability will only come when voters punish self-serving politicians at the ballot box.

## Key Takeaways
- [1:24] Proposed reforms like ten-year PM term limits and ombudsman bills are largely cosmetic concessions to assuage DAP's voter base rather than structural fixes to the state.
- [4:31] Meaningful institutional reform must dismantle the unchecked powers of the Ministry of Home Affairs (KDN) and repeal the archaic Sedition Act.
- [12:32] PAS has consistently pursued Negara Islam since its founding, using decades of affiliated schooling to build an enduring ideological base that non-Muslims fear will institutionalize second-class citizenship.
- [18:44] The High Court ruling affirming Sabah's constitutional entitlement to 40% of its derived revenue since 1974 represents an existential fiscal liability for Putrajaya.
- [29:50] East Malaysians carry deep resentment that national monuments like the Petronas Twin Towers were financed by Bornean oil wealth while their own basic infrastructure remains neglected.
- [33:41] Restoring Sabah and Sarawak's 35% parliamentary seat share represents the single most vital institutional mechanism to rebalance federalism and prevent unilateral constitutional amendments by Peninsular Malaysia.
- [40:15] Putrajaya will never voluntarily concede power unless voters in both Peninsular and East Malaysia aggressively punish entrenched ruling coalitions at the ballot box.

## Chapters
0:00 Institutional Reforms and Term Limits
3:55 The Deep State and Home Ministry Power
12:05 The PAS Agenda: Myth vs Reality
18:11 Sabah's 40% Revenue and MA63
27:12 Secession Rhetoric vs Historical Grievances
33:41 The 35% Parliamentary Seat Dilemma
39:30 The Ballot Box vs Federal Reset

## Transcript
[0:00] Welcome to the guy show podcast. Today myself and Said we have a guest with us Professor James Chin. The Professor of ASEAN studies from the University of Tasmania. He's also a visiting professor to a number of our local university and institutions. He is also a coaching boy. So welcome Prof Prof. Thank you very much for the opportunity to have a chat with both of you. Okay, our conversation today let's start our conversation today with a with the prime minister's announcements before he left for Turkey of some of the reforms that that he wants to be tabled to Parliament.

[0:43] He wants he wants to be a Dorian farmer. 2036 You know, so um Prof What what what what do you say about these reforms that has been that was announced before he left for Turkey? Sure, I think two points. The first one is that obviously he's doing this on behalf of DAP. Because there was a great pressure on DAP after the Sabah elections. Because they felt that you know the Chinese were moving against them and the Chinese are angry about a set of issues. And one of the set of issues the Chinese are angry about is this lack of reforms. So if you look at the all the things he announced

[1:24] are basically not new things. A lot of things have already been announced. So this is very much to please the Chinese ground. Secondly as I mentioned earlier a lot of things he announced like the 10-year limit for the prime ministership, the new freedom of information act ombudsman office. All these are actually been discussed for the last few years. But it is my position that a lot of the core issues that Malaysia needs to reform has still not been discussed and I don't think there's any plans to make fundamental reforms to the Malaysian body politic. So my position is that

[2:00] it's good that he's announced that he's going to go through this list of items that has been spoken about for the last few years. But the core issues is not being addressed. Mhm. Said I yeah I agree. This 10-year limits on 10-year PM has been around for a long time. I remember I wrote about it in the year 2000. It's also in my books. But it's a good thing it's happening. I hope it happens soon enough. And it's interesting you said that he announced this reform as a result of pressure from DAP after the Sabah election debacle. Basically yeah. But you notice that this reform is at the

[2:39] national level for the whole country which is a good thing. But what about the people in Sabah a month after the elections? Has has anything much changed in Sabah? That one I think has to be another topic by itself. But anyway it's it's a good step forward and I hope they get this thing through Parliament quickly. And I hope particularly about the ombudsman they do it right and they do it well because you know there's sometimes as many a slip between the the cup and the lip. So we look forward to what is best for the country. Yeah. Well I I for for me personally I think

[3:13] the first prime mover of it I while I there may be some core issues I want to go to that afterwards but term limit is is something that we sorely need if you ask me so that we don't have a we don't have executives with permanent powers that you know don't have you don't have a change in the leadership. Sometimes that's that's one of the simplest thing you can do in terms of making changes, right? Ensuring that there is a change in leadership. And institution institutionalizing that in our in in our political system. But you are mentioning just now Prof there are some core reforms that that

[3:55] you would like to see. Maybe you can maybe let's let's talk about what do you consider to be core reforms? Right. So in terms of the core reforms which this is nothing to do Anwar but this is more to do with the Malaysian body politic. So you can see right a lot of issues I'm talking about the political institution a lot of the issues in terms of system failure in Malaysia can be traced back to KDN. Kementerian Dalam Negeri. A lot of issues we face are with the police security forces oversight of things that the special branch involved in enforced disappearance and things. All these things

[4:31] lah. Home minister basically home ministry a lot of key reforms you need in terms of body politic is actually the road goes back to the home ministry. So even things like FOI right people like myself believe that the FOI bill is not really going to work properly within the context that it is supposed to work simply because in the Malaysian system right every government document is OSA. So you call freedom of information act okay.

[4:57] And also the way the bill is written my understanding is that right the government can reject any request by citing national security grounds. In other words you don't know what is the reason they reject the bill. So these are some of the key issues that you know that has not been addressed. The other key issues that's not been redressed is that if you really want to open up society one of the things that you need to get rid of whether you like it or not is the sedition act. So again it's been something that's been talked about you know by the NGO community for a very

[5:26] long time. So these are the core issues that can really fundamentally change the body politic of Malaysia. And very often as with our political system right politicians skirt around the side but they do not want to deal with the core issues. Mhm. Said we talked about sedition. Yeah we spoke about abolishing these things in a previous podcast. This is long long overdue. Very archaic sedition act is very archaic. It doesn't serve the purpose. But again politicians are very clever. Even if you make laws and they have ways of circumventing laws. If they want to do something less than good

[6:03] they'll find ways of doing it. Everybody thought last time that once we abolish the internal security act that the country would change and everything would be fine. But you see you mentioned Pastor Ko's disappearance. He disappeared after the internal security act was abolished. So they don't need the ISA to make people disappear if they want to. It happens. But I would rather the the exact administration of what do you call this powers of certain important personalities. For example the the attorney general. The AG of course he has to be free and independent to to

[6:37] decide as he wants. But they have issues have cropped up with some of the previous AGs where they did not prosecute something or when they did prosecute something well the general feeling was that the public was not happy. So what is a mechanism that we can put in place to overcome supposing we have a AG who's not so good how do we overcome this? We are stuck once he's once he's appointed. I I suppose this new this new reform about the AG I hope they make they make the AG answerable answerable to somebody. The appointment of the AG also has to be taken away from the politicians. If it's

[7:11] best if it goes to Parliament a parliamentary appointment. But we discussed this earlier. I personally would prefer AGs and other important personalities in the in the government service and especially security services police and all that that they present report cards to a parliamentary committee. Just a report card you know. They're not held liable. They cannot be held legally liable no way. Otherwise nobody wants to be AG. But there should be some kind of a timely schedule.

[7:34] about Said? I know report what they've done in the past year. Yes so that at least you have a bipartisan parliamentary committee objective committee who can at least question. Report card what has gone wrong what have you done. If there cases like this Indra Gandhi cases what's happening just updates. But that's exactly what I'm talking about when I say we need fundamental change to home ministry in terms of its oversight structure. And all these need not need not exactly go to Parliament all the time. It's sometimes it's within the power of prime minister or cabinet even the minister

[8:06] himself. But I think many of these things will not change until you keep changing the government. That's it. Yeah. Oh I'm more I'm more skeptical than that. Like okay well like what DAP as you said DAP is pressuring the government now on this term limits. Exactly it has to go through the ballot system. You when they lose the votes then they start thinking talking about reform. Hopefully we benefit. Yeah yeah. Uh I think structural I think we have real structural I mean I personally I've been talking in the previous podcast and that one of the things I find is a you got Parliament which is the

[8:45] legislative body, right? And it's and then the same legislative body goes into the executive branch so to speak. So you don't have separation of powers really. Yeah but but that is the design of the Westminster system.

[9:04] I know. And I'm I'm finding that actually with the with the way the Westminster system works it's very difficult to do reforms because of that particular structure if you ask me. You know? So I mean that being the case we are talking about trying to get reform. Okay we'll see what happens with this tabling of this especially I personally the ombudsman bill the I mean the term limit yeah. I think that's critical. The reforms will happen when the people start demanding for it. You raise your voice and you start you insist that we want this reforms it will happen. I

[9:40] think our Malaysian people Malaysian voters we are just too compliant. Take things what do you call this? We don't speak our minds. It's disagree with you on that. It's a it's a good thing it's a good thing that the Sabah elections now you know you you had to the state polls. where the DAP lost the eight seats. So, you know, they're doing something. But we have tolerated too many things for too long. Sedition Act, you do you know, it was it was sort of put in cold storage in 2018, only for a few weeks and it came back. Nobody really kicked up a fuss. So, I think we need to pressure more. The

[10:14] people people have to speak up more and make this an issue so that the parliamentarians take note. Anyway, to carry on what I said about the fact that, you know, people are not interested. My theory for a long time is that the political class in Malaysia, those people who really interested in politics are number no more than 5,000. The majority people actually are not interested. So, for example, right, if you look at the reactions to the all the reforms that I mentioned, right? The one that people are most excited were not the political reforms. Was actually more Sarawak money and more money

[10:45] given by the government rather than the actual political reforms. And yet the three of us here who are members of the chartering of political club, we know those those giving up money, right, that is a simple thing to do. The real difficult thing to do is how do you reform the structural or the institutional part of the government. That is the long-lasting legacy, not giving up money. Any government can give up money. Yeah. I I think I I go back to what Syed was saying just now, you know, about the the people making it hurt. The only way politicians actually listen to you is you and

[11:23] you kick them out of office. You know, and that's then they will wake up. So, I mean, this particular thing, as you said, they've got pressure, right? And then they need to look at something to deliver that is really tangible. So, the question actually then I here, especially in for for before we go to Sabah Sarawak, we want to go to Sabah Sarawak for a while. I mean, and between the what is what is going on with the state and federal relationships. But even here in in Malaysia, uh sorry, in Semenanjung, right? In Semenanjung Malaysia, the um the bogeyman that is always put up is PAS.

[12:05] You know, so that is what is being put in as if you don't for vote for us, this is what you're going to get. How do you How do you jump across that particular bridge? You know, I mean, and and and and get a message across if you are worried about that. About us going into the theocratic mode. As a political

[12:32] Why is it a bogeyman when it's a fact? No, that's the that's that's the that's the one. Yeah. No, for me, right, it's really not a bogeyman because the the first day PAS was established, they made Negara Islam their prime target. But nobody expected them to win. They used to lose their deposits. But my point is that PAS is the only party that has been the most consistent throughout the Malaysian system. They've never abandoned their their their core target, which is Negara Islam. And the reality is that the non-Malays in this country cannot accept Negara Islam

[13:06] because they understand that if this country is Islamic country, automatically, I know, they will be second-class citizens. So, that's the reason why they are {quote} {unquote} the bogeyman. So, for me, right, it is not really a bogeyman. It's really a factual thing that, you know, they are afraid PAS will fundamentally change the current system we have because the current system we have is a very French a very strange system. Although officially we are Westminster system, right, we also have local elements infused into the the the the Westminster system. So, what people don't understand

[13:39] is that we don't have one Westminster system. We have nine Westminster system because of the the the sultan thing plus Sabah and Sarawak. So, our system of governance is actually very very complicated. The only thing we didn't pick up from the Westminster system is that we stopped the local government elections. So, we have a two-tier system, the state government and the federal government. And this is where I think we need fundamental changes. But because the federal government is so powerful, for me at least, changes have to be done at the central level first

[14:11] before you move down to the next level. Well, I think PAS PAS chef only knows how to cook one item on the menu. Look, I think one of the reasons PAS has been singularly successful, my personal opinion is because they've been very consistent with the message. Secondly, they're successful because over the last 20, 30 years, right, I think the you know, the PAS kindergarten, PAS school, all these things have produced a large core of young people who really believe that the alternative to the current Westminster system is Negara Islam. That to me is is is is a really important issue.

[14:48] they they preach to converted. Even their tadika and all the system. But I have raised this point previously. Maybe I you you can share your thoughts on this. They don't have the numbers. You see the the you see in Malaysia, we do not have very accurate demographic data, you know. Nobody knows exactly how many Indians there are in the country because the numbers don't seem to add up. Anyway, talking about the Muslim population, PAS Muslim population, what is the actual numbers of the Muslim population? It is not it is I don't think it goes beyond 60% because Sabah Sarawak Bumiputeras,

[15:20] many of them are not Muslims. You're talking about a 50/50 plus, you know, Muslim population. Most of them are in Semenanjung. Okay, so because of that there's a concern over concentration here. But nevertheless, it's only about slightly over 50% of the vote. And this vote is always split. It will always be split, the Malay vote. So, for them to be bogeyman or take over the reins of parliament and things like that, take over power, it's going to be a bit of an uphill climb for them. That's my view. I have to disagree with you again. The reason is because, right, for the

[15:51] longest time, if you look at Malaysian studies or, you know, the talking heads, the political class, right, nobody believed that you can have an all-Malay government. And that's exactly what happened in 2020. People never thought that

[16:04] So, how is PAS going to form the government? No, no, no, no, no. I'm saying that, you know, the all-Malay government of PAS, UMNO, and Bersatu came together in 2020. People thought that that would never be possible because I'm sure you and I would agree on one thing, that Bersatu was formed to take over UMNO.

[16:20] doesn't put PAS in the driver's seat. They have to compromise with Bersatu and UMNO and all the others who are not the Hudud and Sharia type. Definitely not Bersatu, definitely not UMNO, and definitely not Amanah. So, you can have all-Malay government what what they call Perikatan Nasional. Perikatan I think they call it. That's what they're aiming for. But I'm talking about the PAS bogeyman. I don't think they will be able to override the other Malay parties and enforce what what they want, Sharia system.

[16:45] to disagree. Well, I I I mean, regardless whatever it is, I think the country needs um real alternative. Because why? If we don't provide real alternative for the people and people don't have real alternative, there's no threat. There's no threat for for people in power to actually reform. And that's basically what needs to happen in the in the current landscape, you know. I mean, we can't keep going like this. And I mean, I've come from the business sector, right? And if you ask and you look at what happened to Venezuela, why did they they they had a democracy before.

[17:26] All right, but the policies were wrong. And and then they went socialist, right? And it's it made it even worse. So, you you can see that you can be rich resource-wise, but and yet you're still poor and extremely poor. You know, the same has happened to Iran. Right? And this is uh the and and, you know, doing the same thing for the same people and and giving them the power without any threat is where, you know, it's the problem. So, that's what the Sabah people are asking now. They want their money. Give us your two cents' worth. Yeah. Now, the the other thing I wanted to

[18:11] mention is that one of the core issues facing Malaysia in the coming years is this issue of federal-state relationship, especially relating to Sabah and Sarawak. As you know, right, for the last 10 to 15 years, uh before that, right, nobody talked about the thing called Malaysia Agreement. Now, when you talk about MA63, everybody has heard of it. They may not understand it, but they understand there were some grievances in Sabah and Sarawak. Coming back to the 40%, why it is a big issue in 2026 this year is there was High Court decision in Sabah that says that the federal

[18:44] government owes Sabah 40% of the revenue derived from Sabah. What people on this side in Semenanjung do not know is that this was actually written into the constitution back in 1963. Now, the federal government has stopped paying the 40% from 1974 onwards. So, the judge found that, you know, the federal government is liable for this 40% from 1974 onwards. So, the amount of money is huge. And all the people I spoke in Sabah believe that the federal government is trying to find a way out of paying this 40% because the federal government simply do not have this amount money. Even if a formula is

[19:25] found, the federal government will have to pay this amount in staggered amount. But based on my discussion on this side, right, it is my contention that the Malay establishment believes that, you know, Sabah should not get this 40%. And I can tell you, right, ordinary Sabahans are very very angry about this. So, for the last several years, I've been arguing that we really need to reset federal-state relationship, not only for Sabah and Sarawak, but also for the Semenanjung side. Because uh it is my contention that during the Mahathir era, Mahathir centralized too much power in the

[20:00] federal government. And that is the reason why, you know, we have this idea of Mahathirism. Mahathirism would not have existed if Mahathir had not centralized so much power. I um okay, I see that this is ebb and flow, you know, like high tide, low tide in this uh in this sort of push or demand for uh more autonomy, you know, autonomy versus secession, secede, become independent. When it comes to money, they want autonomy, all right? And it's not just Sabah and Sarawak where oil money is involved. Kelantan is an oil issue. Kelantan also took the matter to court.

[20:35] Yes. So, you have Kelantan, Sabah, and Sarawak who basically they asking for oil revenue. Their rightful, what they say is their rightful claim to oil revenue. In Sabah and Sarawak, this issue has become intertwined with the MA63 uh actually what they want is fiscal more fiscal spending capacity. They just want money.

[20:56] with you, but anyway Uh but you see the the the demand for autonomy to me I look at it money is one thing. And then when Putrajaya screws up certain policies, education for example, education now Sarawak wants basically to decide the education system and so does Sabah. Why? Because, you know, the education system to at the federal level is is so messed up. Uh here we in Semenanjung the stress is on Malay. Uh Abang Johari said Abang Johari said we're going to go with English. The government said we're going to we will not accept any correspondence other than Malay with federal government

[21:32] correspondence. Abang Johari said no, you can write in English in Sarawak. So, you see whatever they feel that the Putrajaya fails in that policy, then they want autonomy to decide that. So, education is one. The other one is health also. People are upset. But do they do not ask for for autonomy? For example, to decide their own security matters, let's have our own police or own maritime, you know, marine police or maritime forces or even army, navy, or police. They don't because that one is okay, that's functioning quite all right. So, this demand for autonomy comes up.

[22:05] Money, yes, definitely, just like Kelantan. And it demand for autonomy pops up more often when Putrajaya fails to deliver. So, I think if Putrajaya gets its act together, the this demand on autonomy it may go away by itself. Uh issue of MA63, it's to me it's like very convoluted. Many people don't know what they're talking about. I was reading one uh I think Sabah Sarawak politician, he called MA63 an international agreement, that it was an international agreement between international countries, Sabah, Sarawak, and Malaysia Malaya at the time 63, Malaysia.

[22:42] Uh this is debatable. Singapore was also part of the agreement. Was it an international agreement with Singapore? It used to belong to Johor. The people are the same, you see. We are basically these are all the leftovers from our good friends the British colonial involvement and meddling. So, you can debate all those things till the cows come home. I want to just point out, you know, Zaid Ibrahim recently he made a controversial statement. He said if Sarawakians really want to break away, go ahead or something like that. And surprisingly the people in Sarawak who who are with for example

[23:18] the government Abang Johari's uh uh group, they were upset. They said that Zaid is not respecting us. He wants secession Sarawak. If you don't want you can leave. And they some even threatened to make a police report against Zaid Ibrahim. Zaid Ibrahim merely said that since they are demanding for all these, you basically it's up to you to decide, you see. So, there are people while they they do not they do not or they like to ask for things to do with autonomy, yeah, especially now education, oil money, things like that. But when push comes to shove, I don't think they want

[23:50] to leave Malaysia or separate or things like that. They want autonomy in certain things which I think Kelantan is also asked. I would I'll just say that your views, what you just said, right, is very typical of the intellectual views on the Malayan side. I totally disagree and I'll explain why, but I want to listen to your views first. Mhm. No, I've I I can understand. I lived in Sarawak for 8 years actually. You know, um and the the sentiment of Sarawakian and Sabah and I totally understand. In fact, I mean, I don't understand the the intricacy of the politics of MA63.

[24:32] Therefore, that's why actually to be honest with you, I'm I try to stay out from that discussion because that's so much of legalities involved. Um and there's historical um uh and you have to track back the the the historical context of it. Uh but from the people's standpoint on the ground, I would say that the the sentiment is much stronger than people in Malaya understand.

[24:58] Yes. That's the biggest thing, you know, that I I find a disconnect. Um is that uh the the political the political leadership is in essence actually uh voicing what they are seeing on the ground on the ground. You know, so the question become in terms of state-federal relationship, right? Is you need to recalibrate it somehow. Because if you want the federation to actually succeed, you have to like what say say say to a certain extent is correct, which is that if you start screwing up here, how you going to sell your policies over there? If I if I may if I if I may just

[25:43] finish the point. Exactly, it all depends on how Putrajaya behaves. You do you you manage things well, all these things I think will go away. Okay, the other issue is that both in Sabah and Sarawak, the degree or the level of whether people want to talk about this autonomy and even, you know, secession and all that also depends on the background. You see in Sabah, Shafie Apdal Warisan, they want 25 seats. Shafie is ask is asking for autonomy. He's asking, but he doesn't talk about secession because he's also candidate for prime minister of Malaysia one day

[26:12] maybe. So, it it depends on who you are. Shafie represents the the Muslim vote, the people on the east coast of Sulu and all that. The same thing applies in Sarawak. You have various groupings. You have the the Dayak vote and then you have also the Muslim vote. You have the Chinese voters, you know. The Chinese have a the Chinese have very commercial and economic base. They want what is good for the economy. Whereas the indigenous people and the Dayaks as well as the Kadazans and the Dusuns and the Muruts in Sabah, they are more on land, culture, religious issues, you

[26:43] see. So, each one of these has got a different view on what they how they look at how much what what what exactly is autonomy and things like that. They may not all agree at the same level. They're not on the same they're not exactly on the same page. They could be in the same book or same chapter, but they're different they're definitely not on the same page. So, this is to me it is not it's not looking at it as a one complete block, you know, where you can look at it focus on it focus on it exactly. No, it's not. It's it's very vague. Maybe the the borders are blurry.

[27:12] Many views in there. Yeah, exactly. I mean, this is this is your view is actually typical of the people I speak on this side. And let me I don't want to do say a correction. Let me present to you the views from the other side from the East Malaysian side, okay? I'll start off by by just answering your point about Zaid Ibrahim. I think Zaid Ibrahim has been saying all sorts of crazy stuff. So, I don't think we should hold him down on one particular statement, but he said a lot of crazy stuff, okay? Okay, I'll start off with that, okay? The other thing I think the

[27:42] the the the thing I really don't disagree with is that you conflict asking for autonomy with the independence movement or so-called secessionist movement. Uh as an authority who has studied Sabah and Sarawak for a very long time, I can tell you right, that movement right is actually a very small movement. If you go to the Sarawak even the ordinary people, right, most at the present moment at the present moment actually don't buy the argument about secession. And the reason is not for political or intellectual argument, it's a very simple argument. Nobody is willing to

[28:10] pay the blood price. Because it is obvious that if anybody push for real secession, right, then the federal authorities will will push the nuclear option, which is the you arm arm response. I'm sure this is open knowledge here. All the security bases or armed forces bases in Sabah, Sarawak, right, all the soldiers are from the Semenanjung. Most Sarawak soldiers are actually posted on this side. So, everybody understand the security situation. So, this sort of secessionist talk, right, it is more of a talk to help those pro-autonomy people to apply pressure on

[28:44] the federal government rather than real talk, okay? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. So, anyway, to present to you the Sabah Sarawak thing, right? So, basically you have to understand, right, these feelings comes from historical grievances. So, but the bottom line is everybody in Sabah and Sarawak, it doesn't matter whether you're SPM graduate or PhD graduate, right, they have this feeling that for last 60 years in the Malaysian federation, right, Sabah and Sarawak got a raw deal. Because prior to the formation of Malaysia, right, put Singapore to one side, right, it was

[29:16] widely agreed among the political elites who were trying to put this thing together, right, one of the reasons you bring Sabah and Sarawak in was that Sabah and Sarawak would be developed at a much faster rate and that will help you to catch up. Okay? And they feel that one of the reasons why Sabah and Sarawak did not catch up was because Sabah and Sarawak oil and gas resources was taken by so-called Petronas and the money was spent over here. So, the narrative is very simple, right? Petronas is a national body and get all their signature projects are uh are in

[29:50] Peninsular Malaysia. The best example is KLIA, Putrajaya, Petronas Twin Tower. All these are basically funded by Petronas money. Can the both of you name me one signature project done by Petronas in Sabah and Sarawak? And the answer is no. So, for the Sabah and Sarawak people, right? They're very angry about the treatment they've received for last 60 years. In fact, the joke in Sabah and Sarawak is that this Petronas Twin Tower, right? One tower was paid by oil and gas money from Sabah and the other tower was paid by oil and gas money from Sarawak. And why is there

[30:21] two tower? Because it's these two fingers pointing to Sabah and Sarawak, okay? Now, these historical grievances is real and that's the reason why I said the federal government has to sort out this historical grievances. Now, the Malay intellectual class and the Malaysian intellectual class and political class in Malaysia refuse to accept this argument. Now, the reason is people, you know, holding this view including yourselves, right? The reason why you said that it is not a big issue because, like you said, is an issue of how well or how efficient or, you know, this

[30:53] government is doing and therefore, you know, Sabah and Sarawak agree with it. Now, I've been making the argument this is a real thing, huh? Because historical grievances, if you allow it to simmer, right? It can get out of hand, okay? Now, people who said that, "Oh, we we we cannot deal with this, right?" These people don't understand history. You ask yourself, right? The most important thing that happened in terms of social engineering on the country, right? Was the NEP, 1971, okay? To social engineer a new Malaysia. Why the NEP came in? The reason NEP came

[31:26] in was to address historical grievances. What was the historical grievances? The Malays were not given a piece of the economic pie. The first speech given for justification of NEP was that the Malays owned 2.4% of the corporate wealth. Remember? So, that's the reason why we had NEP. So, NEP, right? At the very core essence was to deal with historical grievances. And this is exactly what the people in Sabah and Sarawak are talking about. Why can't the West Malaysian political establishment deal with historical grievances faced by Sabah and Sarawak?

[32:00] fully with you that building twin towers and all these prestige projects was not a proper usage of funds. It reminds me of our friend Sukarno in Jakarta who went around building all those monuments. Uh that is definitely I I I do not disagree with that. And definitely the development in Sabah and Sarawak, especially Sabah, is way behind, way behind. But there's still the the poorest state in the country, still Kelantan, you know? It's not Sabah and Sarawak.

[32:25] No, no, no. It's not It's not an issue who is the poorest state. It's not the the the Yeah, but development and developing people as a whole, the community, society as a whole, of course, they are extremely extremely backward in uh They're lagging behind. We have to focus on this. That's why I feel that I still feel that the issue rests with the politics. The issue rests with how the voters vote. The issue rests with how how they they put pressure on the government from Sabah and Sarawak. How they put pressure on Putrajaya. The and the issue rests with the political

[32:56] leadership in Sabah and Sarawak. They have to They have the power. They have the seats. You see, we are a democracy, a parliamentary system, Westminster. Everything is in We have never been a democracy. We We have We We still We decide issues through the parliament. If you threaten not to support your the coalition in power, they will fall apart. They will listen to you.

[33:13] That That is actually not true, sir. You need We need No, we need We need the political leadership, especially Sabah and Sarawak, to really exert the the muscle of their number of seats that they have in parliament and to get what they want. This is very important. That's the only way. You cannot do anything else. You cannot do any other way. The finance minister is appointed by Putrajaya. If you're not If you don't have a say there, you're not going to get much. Okay. So, this is where I feel that they have to Sabah Sarawak, they have to use their political muscle more effectively.

[33:41] What I'm trying to say is that do not sell out. Okay. If that's the case, right? If you believe that Sabah and Sarawak should have more political power, then why is the political class here dead set against giving Sabah and Sarawak 35% of the seats? That was the same formula used in the 1963

[33:57] leadership of Sabah and Sarawak exerts their muscle. Do you speak up for your rights or do you sit on the same memorandum to the government. The government ignored it. I feel that if they stand up for their rights and put their foot down, they'll get what they want. But too often too often, especially Sabah in the past, UMNO was in Sabah. UMNO Sabah sings UMNO KL tune. So, that's it. You're not going to get anything. If your KL party your Malay party is also the ruling was a ruling party in Sabah, they're going to sing the KL tune. So, I My My My advice to the Sabah people,

[34:29] Sarawak people, you pick political leaders, members of parliament, state leaders, whoever who will speak your language, who will represent you properly. Yeah, but If they sell out, you They've sold you out down the the problem is that the the the political class on the Malayan side refuse to give any concessions to Sabah and Sarawak. That's the bottom I think they can close deals quite effectively. No, no, no, no. I have to come back to you this idea about Malaysia being a democratic state. Malaysia has never been a democratic state. In fact, I can prove to you half a dozen statements

[35:00] prior to 2018. The Malayan political class always called Sabah and Sarawak fixed deposit. In other words, we don't have to do We don't have to do anything. They will vote for Barisan. And that's no more. That's no more. No, no. I'm not saying there's no more, Yes. But I'm saying historically Malaysia has not been a democracy.

[35:17] attitude. I I understand that. Well, I can I can back you up. Bro, I I think I mean I I I think there's there's a middle ground here somewhere. I I see in essence I I don't like the word middle ground actually because why? That's like a compromise, you know? But it's not. I I What What I'm saying What I'm seeing from what I I understand, um I think what Said is alluding to as well is actually that political pressure is that hey, if I don't support body, which is what you're saying, you know? If if that's no longer the fixed deposit, right? Then your power is gone. Right?

[35:52] So, it's just it's just a question of leveraging your power. I think Abang Johari he's a good man to get this thing really going in Sarawak where they really demand for what is good for them. And also in Sabah I have some faith in Shafie Apdal. But before this, you know, the chief ministers in Sarawak, they were basically KLites. They were someone Malay people. So, you were not You were You already had the You were already given the short end of the stick from day one. Before before before we we proceed to finishing off, I need you to just do one factual correction.

[36:30] You talk about the fact that in Sarawak has to go along the English road and you mentioned the fact that, you know, the Sarawak government announced that, you know, when you write to the government department, you can write in English, okay? I just need to do a factual correction, right? Uh Sarawak constitution said that the the state language official state language is both Bahasa English. So, that's the reason why they can do it. It's not because of the of any other thing. Yes, but at least they they stood up. They stood up to Putrajaya.

[36:55] That has always been there. It's just it hasn't been highlighted because the the bottom line is that the people in Malaya, right? Has always ignored Sabah and Sarawak. Only after the MA63 blow up, then you started looking seriously. This is my point, right? The point I'm trying to make is that historical grievances is a real thing. The political class must deal with it. Just like you dealt with historical grievances back in 1973 1970. If you don't deal with the historical grievances, the core historical grievances of Sabah and Sarawak, right? This This political thing will blow up

[37:27] in the future. So, it is my hope that the political class on this side of the South China Sea understand the grievances, take it seriously, and deal with it. How much changes have there been in Sabah since the elections last month? Has there been any changes? You see? Uh No, but but you see, this is a typical Malayan attitude. I'm asking you to look at historical grievances. You're talking about what is happening now.

[37:49] reality is nothing has changed. So, who are the people in charge? The same chief ministers in charge. you're blaming Sabah and Sarawak for the lack of of the fiscal grievances. I'm not blaming Sabah and Sarawak, but at the end of the day, the change has to come from the polls, the ballot box. No, that is totally That is totally wrong because all the powers in Putrajaya.

[38:09] Yeah, the next question is for how long will the people in Sabah tolerate this no change situation? No, the point is that If you want If you want to deal with historical grievances, right? Putrajaya has all the powers to deal with it. It's Putrajaya refused to deal with it. So, for example, you got this MA63 committee that's been set up by federal government. In fact, a lot of people do not realize that the first person to set up, right? It's not post-2018. Najib actually was the first one to set up the the MA63 committee.

[38:36] What should they achieve or what would they achieve then this committee? No, my point is they have to deal with the historical grievances laid out by Sabah and Sarawak. But they are not and that's the reason why all the core issues put forth by Sabah and Sarawak on MA63 committee has not been dealt with because the powers on this side refuse to deal with it. This is the problem. Yeah. Now, I mean, knowing that, knowing that we can we can keep saying that, but knowing that already, then what's the next step, you know, for Sabah and Sarawak? What can they do?

[39:09] next step is No, it's not up to them because the power is on this side. So, the Malayan political class must wake up to the fact that there is a set of historical grievances in Sabah and Sarawak. is what if they don't? No, this is the point. This is why This is why people like me keep reminding people on this side that, you know, you have to wake up to the political grievances.

[39:30] have not changed anything since 1963 since the Malayan Agreement, uh Malayan Malaysia Agreement, nothing much has been done. So, I'm just thinking how long the Sabahans and Sarawakian people are going to like tolerate this and do nothing. They have to do something. No, no, no. I can rest assured what you said is true. I can rest you can rest assured tomorrow the Malayan politicians don't care about Sabah and Correct, correct, correct. And the day after

[39:50] Yeah, you and I can agree on that. Yeah, that's it. Yeah, no, it's it's it's not going to change. So, what is Sabah and Sarawak going to do? You cannot just wring your hands and cry. Oh, they don't care for us. What are you going to Okay, let me tell the people of Sabah and Sarawak the Malayan politicians are not going to care about you. Correct. Correct. So, which means which means that what I say is correct. They don't care. No, no, I I I'm sitting here listening. The both of you. Right? And I'm saying that actually, you guys both agree. The difference is very

[40:15] simple. I think Say is coming from the point of view that um that uh The ballot box has to decide. the ballot box has to decide. And you can dis the goes to where I'm I'm saying. If there is no threat of change, Giving DAP 8-0 that is a is a very good move, first move. And I think the Sabah people should think about it.

[40:36] the same thing. GPS controlled by the personal numbers in Sarawak. change it. You see, if you don't change it, you're not going to change your fate at all. Because as you say, it's written in stone. They don't care about Sabah and Sarawak. So, so no point repeating again and again. You only make yourself hoarse. It is up to the Sabah and Sarawakian people. 8-0 for DAP. Excellent. Move it to Sarawak. That's your only chance. So, so zero for DAP in the next election. That's your only way to be aware of democracy. It's the only chance. Yeah, that's exactly that point. I mean, we

[41:07] can keep I mean, we have our When I look at it, actually, I think when when Sarawak says we're going to do it in English, we're going to have education in English, I'm like, yeah, there you go. Go. Yeah, but that's because in the Sarawak constitution, English is an is is That's the matter. But they didn't pull those things over last time, at least. Yeah, that doesn't matter. At least Abang Johari he said it, you know, he's a leader of a state saying it. This is his mind. He's merely stating a fact. No, it's implementation. Let's put it this way. It's always Nobody people know that or

[41:35] It it's only since it's always been there, it's about implementation. But nobody has implemented that. No, the reason why nobody has implemented is because Malaysia was not democracy. Malaysia was a was basically a semi-authoritarian government by Putrajaya because Putrajaya had too much power. I am sure that you guys will agree with me that Mahathir centralized power. If you don't agree with me that you gave when you give Dr. Mahathir two-thirds majority which he had throughout his time. Yes. He can do anything he wants. But you know what? Correct. I think the simple The point

[42:04] that Say is making is very simple. It's we gave them power. Yeah, that's right. You know? You give me two-thirds What two-thirds of the ballot box? You give me two-thirds majority. I think my No, but but the most of the two-thirds majority came from this side. Yeah. That's the system that we have. I mean, I think we can argue till the cows come home in terms of, you know, moving forward.

[42:24] Let me have the last word. No, okay. The most the most important The most important thing going forward, right, is that the Malayan political class must agree to give Sabah and Sarawak their number one wish list, which is 35% of the seats in the Dewan Rakyat. And Anwar Ibrahim will go down in history if he can deliver that. That will fundamentally change, as you said, the federal-state relationship because Sabah and Sarawak will be in a position to leverage the 35%. Right now, they can't do it because they're 25% of the seats in Parliament. Well, I mean, that that is a that is a point There is

[43:00] a point that we must consider. We also have to consider those constituencies here where you have 150,000 voters in one in one parliamentary seat. Yeah. That also we have to No, the favorite example that the NGOs is is they're comparing Putrajaya to Bangi. Yeah, so we have to we have to look into all this, not just in Sabah and Sarawak, but also here in the peninsula. Like Seputeh has got 100 over 1,000 voters in one seat, you know, that's it's grossly unfair. It's grossly unfair. But but my point is that you cannot link those two issues together. One has got to do with

[43:30] historical grievances. The other is the unfair electoral system. These are two separate issues. Okay. I think to to close it out, I I I I I think um to say that all of a sep all separate issues. Yes, all are separate issues. But if you want to turn around the country, you have to restructure institutional reform um and address them all at almost the same time. Right? This is where I'm coming from, which is you've got the grievances at the state that need to be addressed. You got You got grievances as well that are historical, if you ask me, also historical from the Malayan side, that

[44:12] the political leadership has not done. And the only carrot the only stick we have is actually the ballot box and how we exercise our our our our power at the ballot box.

[44:24] And it works. Yeah. And it works you know, at least we're hearing that, you know, something is going to come up, as you say. So, which means that you agree with me if the ballot box was then to give the leverage to Sabah and Sarawak, they need 35% of the seats. Give them. Yeah. All good. I'm glad I came I came this morning because like I said, I gave out a very nice brunch to be with you guys. No, because we are a democracy. You have to I mean, it's like if you give them 35, right? And you you don't have Also, you have No, my my my point is that the Malay political class and the NGOs here,

[44:59] right, they are fighting Sabah and Sarawak tooth and nail to stop them from getting 35% of the seats. They may not represent all Malaysians and Come on. At the end of the day, I I believe this is what we have to do as Malaysians in totality, right? Which is we have a problem that is structural that can only be um be rectified if the political leadership know they will lose their jobs. If we don't have that stake with them, we can cry to the political leadership, they don't care. Quarter century to get term limits on the prime minister. What about term limits for MPs also? Yeah, why not?

[45:44] But it's a good start. It's a good start. Okay. With that in mind, thank you so much for all for coming along. I enjoyed that. Don't worry, this will have the highest views. Uh I would like to Yeah, please if you you you enjoy and get a lot out of our discussions, subscribe to The Gadget Shop podcast and we'll see you again. Thank you very much.